Revenue management (RM) models have been developed for products characterised as perishable with fixed capacity. This paper proposes mathematical models for RM under oligopolistic competition, using price as the sole factor that affects demand. These models are developed based on two different conditions. First, the competition among players is explicitly under deterministic and stochastic conditions with three possible scenarios namely deterministic oligopoly, sequential oligopoly and extended duopoly are evaluated. Second, the oligopoly competition is explained using customer valuation to capture demand changes towards price fluctuation. The models are then integrated with quantity-based RM to form the revenue model. Optimal pricing strategy is evaluated using game theory approach. All models are developed based on empirical case for hotel RM. The result shows that the model, which is developed using N-player game theory with 'cartel against single player' formation, is the most representative model with consistent ability to predict the actual system.
Introduction
A product is characterised as perishable if the excess inventory at the end of the selling period cannot be stored for the next period or too expensive to be stored. Airline ticketing, hotel, sport and entertainment ticketing are some examples of perishable products with fixed capacity (Bitran and Gilbert, 1996; Netessine and Shumsky, 2002; Talurri and van Ryzin, 2004) . Because of its characteristics, a perishable product with fixed capacity has many challenges in terms of managerial aspects. First, because of its limited capacity or resources, managing the capacity or maximising the utility of resources becomes a crucial decision to gain profit (Netessine and Shumsky, 2002) . The second challenge is due to the demand fluctuation over time that makes demand management more difficult (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004) . Third, the product also belongs to business competition, which means that all players' decisions affect each other. Thus, a proper management method is needed.
Revenue management (RM) is considered as one of the methods widely used to manage perishable product with fixed capacity (Netessine and Shumsky, 2002; Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004; Bitran and Gilbert, 1996) . RM provides a guidance to make a strategy in order to optimise revenue as performance indicator by considering both pricing strategy and capacity allocation (McGill and van Ryzin, 1999) . RM provides model to decide optimal price and capacity allocation since 1972 with many observational domains such as airline, hotel, car rental, etc. RM allows companies to offer a same product to different customer segments with different price levels (Bertsimas and de Boer, 2005) .
In general, there are two main RM models, which are pricing-based RM and quantity-based RM. Pricing-based model or sometimes called demand model represents the demand changes caused by price fluctuation. In this case, price is considered as the sole factor as stated in the classical RM. Meanwhile, quantity-based RM seeks an optimal capacity allocation due to demand uncertainty in order to optimise capacity utilisation.
Most research on RM developed demand models under the context of monopoly or duopoly competition, such as vertical and horizontal competition (Netessine and Shumsky, 2004) , Bertrand model (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004) and customer valuation (Aviv and Pazgal, 2007) . Dai et al. (2004) developed oligopoly competition based on duopoly model. In that case, the competitions among firms are modelled as a repetitive duopoly. In the real business situation, oligopolistic competition seems to be more realistic than the other forms of competition. Therefore, this paper proposes a model for oligopolistic competition, specifically for perishable product with fixed capacity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents previous studies about demand models in RM. Section 3 explains the methods used in this research, detailed explanations about model development, and its principles. Model evaluation on a case study is described in Section 4. At the end of the paper, Section 5 gives a brief conclusion and suggestion of some fruitful future research.
Literature review
In the early research, RM was developed for capacity allocation by optimising resource utility (i.e., room, seats), such as overbooking and booking limit. For example, Bitran and Gilbert (1996) developed booking limit model by utilising stochastic and dynamic customer arrival. Netessine and Shumsky (2004) developed booking limit model for capacity allocation, considering both horizontal and vertical competitions. In that case, the available capacities are categorised into two types: discounted fare and full fare. The horizontal competition refers to a condition when there is no correlation between the demand of the discount fare and the demand of full fare. Thus, the demand function can be built separately for each class. Meanwhile, the vertical competition assumes that customers may move from discounted fare to full fare because of some reasons (i.e., class 1 is fully booked).
Customers may have different degree of willingness to pay for the same product. For instance, airline ticket is getting more expensive as the D-day of the flight is approaching, fashion retailer may apply markdown pricing to clear the excess inventory, e-business companies may use innovative pricing mechanisms that leverage the capability of the internet, etc. In this case, pricing becomes a crucial decision in terms of maximising the expected revenue. Thus, many RM model developments have shifted from capacity allocation perspective to pricing-strategy perspective. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) developed pricing-based RM or demand model for duopoly competition model called Bertrand model. The model was developed in deterministic condition and under perfect competition where all customers choose the lowest price company. Thus, companies with lower price are able to sell all of their products while other companies have zero demand. However, this head-to-head price competition rarely occurs in the real business situation. Dai et al. (2004) improved the previous model by introducing repetitive duopoly concept to represent oligopoly competition. They focused on how to decide an optimal pricing in oligopoly environment. Through repetitive duopoly game, Dai et al. (2004) developed mathematical model to identify the best response to defeat competitors. Nonetheless, the model becomes more complex and requires longer time when there are more players involved in the analysis.
A different approach in modelling duopoly competition is applied by Aviv and Pazgal (2007) . Instead of modelling competition among players, they used customer valuation. According to Aviv and Pazgal (2007) , consumers have their own product valuation. If the company offers lower price compared to their valuation, they will buy the product. In that case, different customer behaviours are considered: myopic and strategic consumers. However, this concept can only be applied for businesses with long selling period. Thus, the model may not be suitable for products characterised to have short selling period.
Similar to Aviv and Pazgal (2007) (i.e., customer perspective), to capture oligopoly competition Gallego and Hu (2014) assumed that price transparency poses challenges for business players with perishable assets, like airline company, to maintain their pricing strategies as a response to their competitors. Due to this trend, customers are able to differentiate products based on their attributes and prices. The model addresses dynamic pricing based on customer purchase choice where customer arrival rate and initial stock are given, and the choice probability based on purchasing time, product attributes, and current prices are given.
On the other hand, Cooper et al. (2015) found that it is possible for sellers to obtain more revenue by making decision using only a monopoly model instead of Nash equilibrium or cooperative solution. This situation is possible because monopoly models incorporate the effects of competition when the estimated parameters of the models are determined based on data collected under competition. However, monopoly demand model cannot capture competition for long run reaction-function (or market response).
This research proposed a model for pricing-based RM under oligopoly competition using various approaches, including deterministic oligopoly, stochastic oligopoly, extended duopoly, and customer valuation. The proposed models are the function of price and developed under deterministic and stochastic conditions. The pricing-based RM models are then integrated with quantity-based RM to develop revenue model. With the aim of modelling the competition, game theory is used. In this case, revenue model is used as input for game theory to find the optimal strategy (i.e., pricing and capacity allocation).
In mathematical model development process, the principles of the existing approaches, such as deterministic duopoly by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) , sequential oligopoly by Dai et al. (2004) , and customer valuation by Aviv and Pazgal (2007) , are utilised to develop demand models. Moreover, in this paper, N-player game theory is used to form a new approach called extended duopoly to capture oligopolistic environment in the actual system.
The models, except customer valuation, consider two customer types called leisure and business travellers (Netessine and Shumsky, 2004; Ghotesson and Riman, 2004) . The term 'leisure travellers' is used to describe customers who have the willingness to buy products in discounted price while the term 'business travellers' represents those who are willing to buy products in full fare. At the end of this paper, the models will be evaluated using statistical tools by comparing the predictions of the models with the actual data from three hotels competition case.
Mathematical model development
The problem addressed in this paper is how to develop pricing strategy and capacity allocation under oligopolistic competition for perishable product with fixed capacity. Pricing strategy is determined by demand model. To find the best representative model for oligopoly condition, possible models mentioned in the literature review are explored, including deterministic oligopoly, sequential oligopoly, extended duopoly and customer valuation.
To find the best strategy for capacity allocation, booking limit approach is used. Netessine and Shumsky (2004) developed booking limit model in the case of capacity allocation using different approaches, namely horizontal and vertical competition. Nonetheless, in this paper, the booking limit model demonstrates how to allocate fixed capacity for given customers as a result of the demand model of two customer types, which are leisure travellers with lower price or discounted price demand and business travellers with higher price or full price demand. The model includes internal decision because it is assumed that competition does not affect this decision.
On the basis of the above considerations, three models are developed to find the best strategy for both pricing and capacity allocation. The first model is demand model, which is developed using two different approaches, competition among players and customer valuation. Three scenarios are considered in modelling the competition among players, which are deterministic oligopoly, sequential oligopoly and extended duopoly. Another demand model developed is based on the purchasing power of the customers or customer valuation. Second, booking limit model as one of quantity-based models is developed to decide the capacity portion for two customer segments. Third, demand and booking limit models are then integrated to form a revenue model. The revenue model is used as an input for game theory to find the best pricing strategy.
To simplify the explanation, the following notations are used throughout the paper. 
Demand model
This section describes RM model development under oligopoly competition with n players. In this case, pricing is assumed to be the only factor that may have impact on the demand obtained by each player. In other words, each player should optimise his price to obtain maximum revenue. Therefore, the demand model is developed using an N-player game.
In the N-player game, we assume that there is a single player competing with other players called competitors with (n -1) as the total number of competitors. Symbolised as SP, a single player bids i P as its pricing strategy to strive against competitors, notated as
with their related strategy (i.e., 1 2 1 , , , ).
To demonstrate oligopoly environment, we use two approaches: competition among players and customer valuation.
There are four possible scenarios that are proposed to find the most representative model towards actual demand. The models are developed under deterministic and stochastic conditions. Three of them are under competition and another one uses customer purchasing power.
Deterministic oligopoly
In this system, it is assumed that the demand of a single player is inevitably influenced by competitors' pricing strategies as long as price is the sole factor in RM. Thus, game theory is utilised in the proposed model to capture the condition.
According to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) , deterministic oligopoly is developed with a proper justification that imperfect competition occurs. Deterministic oligopoly assumes that the total demand for a single player ( ) x simultaneously. Peak season factor is used to identify peak pattern existence based on historical data. If peak occurs, 1 i x = , the predicted demand will increase. Otherwise, it is set to be 0. Logically, if a firm raises price while competitors remain using their previous strategy, customers will move to the competitors only if the price is the sole factor. Therefore, the demand is negatively related to internal price and positively related to competitor's prices. It describes the conflict of interest between single player and its competitors. To present the conflict among the players, ,1 ,
γ − > is used as the logical constraint in equation (1) that describes deterministic oligopoly model for n players, so there are single player namely firm i and (n -1) competitors. 
Sequential oligopoly
The second scenario is sequential oligopoly. Sequential oligopoly, which was previously explored by Dai et al. (2004) The model assumes that customers are not allowed to be out of the system. Hence a constant-sum game competition is applied. In this case, the customers who are kicked out of a company become potential market for other companies. Besides, the model makes a demand response based on two conditions: when the price is higher and when the price is lower than competitors' price.
F symbol indicates the fitted distribution of price levels.
1 i F is the distribution function of the pricing strategy of company i when it bids higher price than company j, while 0 i F is the distribution function when company i offers lower price than company j. If there is no theoretical distribution that fits the price level distribution, then empirical distribution is used as described in equation (4) (Law and Kelton, 1991) .
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where
Proof. The proof can be seen in Appendix 1.
In this case, 0 symbolise the lower price and 1 is for the higher price.
Extended duopoly
When the game abounds with players called N-player game, coalition(s) or cartel(s) with two or more players doing coordinated strategies against another player may exist. If this condition happens, 'cartel against single player' formation is recommended to be applied in the analysis (Feuerstein, 2005; Dragasevic, 2011) . The probability of forming cartel(s) increases since more players are involved in the game. All players except the single player make a cartel to coordinate pricing strategy ( ) j P against the single player ( ) i P . In this case, modified duopoly formation is used, in which the opponent (i.e., cartel) performs coordinated pricing strategy ( ) j P considered as price average of the entire cartel members as illustrated in Figure 3 . Equation (5) 
Customer valuation
The last model is developed using customer valuation instead of competition as used in the previous models explained in Sections 3.1.1-3.1.3. It is assumed that customers have information about the companies, such as price, and they choose a product or a service that fits their valuation best. This assumption illustrates indirect oligopoly competition among players by exploring customer valuation and their response towards price. It is inspired by the statement of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) that total demand is influenced by several dimensions: the product itself, customer preference, and customer behaviour due to the price offered. Customer behaviour that is potentially changed because of price should be an opportunity for companies to gain more revenue. Therefore, this model does not consider the strategy of all competitors in the competition, but decides the best pricing that fits customer valuation to gain more profit. Customer valuation is developed based on customer perspective. It is assumed that if the information of pricing strategy among players is opened for customers, they will choose one that suits their valuation best. It means that all players compete to offer the best suitable pricing for the customers.
In customer valuation model, company does not observe competitors' strategies, but focuses on purchasing power (valuation) of the customers in finite population size. Purchasing power can be predicted using historical data. Thus, two data types, price and demand frequency, are utilised. The data are used to capture customers' purchasing power. Selling price, in this case, is the amount of money that customer spends to buy a product, rather than the average price offered by the company. Therefore, assumed that there is only one customer type, the purchasing power is described by certain probability distribution function. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) is included in the equation (6).
The relationship between customer valuation and pricing strategy is described in equation (6). It explains how pricing strategy affects the prediction of the expected demand. The philosophy of the model in equation (6) is explained in Figure 4 . For example, if a company offers price x per product, customers who have purchasing power above x with mean of ( )
become potential customers for the company. Thus, demand can be determined based on the information of market size N and distribution function of demand frequency F i that is a function of price offered P i .
Booking limit model
Once the demand models are developed, the second step is to develop booking limit model. Booking limit represents quantity-based RM model that gives a guidance to decide optimal capacity allocation due to its fixed capacity. Booking limit model used in this paper refers to the work done by Masruroh and Mulyani (2013) . The purpose of the model is to allocate fixed capacity for two customer types: business and leisure travellers, in order to optimise capacity utilisation when the ratio of discounted price and full price is given. When the booking limit (capacity allocated for the leisure travellers) is achieved, the remaining capacity (protection level) will be offered to the next customers with full price. Thus, the more company sets the booking limit, the less revenue it will get as there is a potential demand from business travellers who actually has higher willingness to pay. On the other hand, less booking limit set by the company possibly results in losing money because the unsold capacity will be higher. The model is developed based on the assumption that customer arrival rate is exponentially distributed. The rate is then used to perform linear regression described in equation (7) using price ratio ( ) i r as its parameter. Booking limit is the number of rooms offered to the customer who is willing to pay with the discounted price ( ) Di P while the remaining capacity called protection level is offered with full fare ( ). 
Revenue model
Once the demand model and the booking limit model have been developed, the last step is developing a revenue model that comprises booking limit model ( ) (8): when the demand exceeds capacity, when the demand is more than booking limit but less than capacity, and when the demand is less than booking limit.
( ) 
Case study
The developed models will be evaluated against an empirical case. In this case, we use hotel industry since the product is characterised as perishable and the capacity is fixed. We collect data from three hotels located in the same area (Yogyakarta, Indonesia) in order to form oligopoly competition. Historical data, including room capacity, daily customer arrival, daily average price, daily revenue, and demand frequency for two price levels, are used to test the general model developed in Section 3. The proposed models are applied in the case of hotel business competition among three players: hotels A, B, and C. The data from each company have been completely recorded. However, based on data plotting, the demand can be categorised as infrequent demand. Thus, to reduce this infrequent demand effect, Pareto diagram is utilised to select the data properly. Consequently, the data are then reduced from 365 to 114. Each hotel provides dataset, which includes capacity, peak pattern, demand, price for all levels, and revenue in 2011. All hotels offer two or more classes with different capacity. Thus, the pricing strategy used in the analysis is the average price of all classes and the models are generated using occupancy rate. All models are also developed by considering statistical test as required in the methods, such as multiple linear regressions (MLR) with linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, and independence of predictors.
Deterministic oligopoly demand model

Deterministic oligopoly model is built by applying MLR with price and peak season as the parameters. Deterministic oligopoly demand model for each hotel is depicted in equation (9).
In the condition of hotel A competes against hotels B and C, the model is .
Hotel A has a peak pattern in January, May, June, and December; hotel B in January, June, September and December; and hotel C in January, February, May, June, July and December. On the basis of data treatment to conform to MLR assumption, Table 1 provides deterministic oligopoly model for hotels A, B, and C. 
Sequential oligopoly demand model
In this scenario, three players are involved in the game. Thus equation (3) is modified to accommodate three players (i, j, and k) as stated in equation (10). There are four possible conditions of pricing strategies: company i offers the highest price, company i uses middle pricing strategy when company j and k bid the highest price, and company i uses the lowest pricing strategy. As explained in the previous section and proved in Appendix 1, the business games including i vs. j and i vs. k have to be played to predict the payoff obtained by player i. It is clearly stated in equation (10) 
Proof. The proof can be seen in Appendix 2
Checking possible conditions and fitting distribution are needed to build sequential oligopoly model. On the basis of the obtained historical data, only condition 3 in equation (3) fits hotel A whereas hotels B and C are under conditions (1) and (3). Henceforth, the empirical CDFs provided in Table 2 will substitute CDFs function in equation (10). The results for hotels A, B, and C are demonstrated in equations (11)- (13), respectively. 
Proof. The proof can be seen in Appendix 3 
Extended duopoly demand model
There are three possible configurations in this game, namely A vs. cartel BC, B vs. cartel AC, and C vs. cartel AB. The cartel's strategy is determined by averaging the pricing strategies of cartel members as mentioned in equation (5). Empirical CDFs for single player and cartel as shown in Tables 3 and 4 are used since there is no representative theoretical distribution.
Figures 5-7 demonstrate pricing strategies used by single player and cartel for each configuration. On the basis of Figures 5-7 , hotel A sets price lower than cartel BC throughout the observed period. Thus, condition (1) never occurs in this configuration, while the other configurations complied with both conditions. 
Customer valuation demand model
Customers' purchasing power that illustrates customer valuation is described by examining the relationship between total demand and price offered in each class. Total demand is used, instead of demand for each product, in order to capture the general pattern of customer purchasing power. This relationship will be used to predict the demand, given the price as it is assumed that customers will buy the product if the price offered is not higher than their purchasing power. Kolmogorov Smirnov (K-S), Anderson Darling (A-D) and Chi-square (C-S) tests are used to analyse whether there is theoretical distribution that represents the data pattern. Table 5 describes the distribution and its parameters of purchasing power for each hotel. This fitted distribution is then integrated to equation (6). 
Booking limit model
Booking limit model is used to represent quantity-based RM model. It is generally used for any pricing-based RM model that has been developed in Section 4.1. Table 6 shows booking limit model for each hotel using linear regression. 
Revenue model
The demand models and the booking limit model are used to form revenue model, as presented in equation (8). In this section, the proposed models will be evaluated using statistical tool to see whether the model represents the actual system. It is performed before doing further analysis. Because the data are not normally distributed, Mann-Whitney test is used to evaluate the model. Table 7 shows the p-value of the comparison between the actual data and the predicted values. As shown in Table 7 , it can be concluded that extended duopoly model is able to consistently represent the actual condition for all hotels although it is not the best model for several cases, such as sequential oligopoly model for hotel A (p-value = 0.812) and customer valuation for hotel B (p-value = 0.762). The most interesting phenomenon is that only extended duopoly model that can predict the actual system for hotel C. Hence, extended duopoly is the most reliable model among the other models.
Optimal pricing strategy
Since extended duopoly is the most suitable model in this case study, optimal pricing strategy is analysed based on equation (5). The model provides two possible optimal pricing. To choose the best solution, each pricing's predicted revenue or output should be examined. 
Proof. The proof can be seen in Appendix 4
By applying equation (14), optimal pricing strategy can be calculated and evaluated for hotel A (A vs. BC), hotel B (B vs. AC) and hotel C (C vs. AB) as shown in Figures 8-10 , respectively. In general, equation (14) provides a guidance to decide the optimal price based on the increment of accumulated revenue. 
Conclusions
This paper proposed mathematical models for RM under oligopolistic competition. The revenue model consists of demand model and booking limit model. The demand models are developed based on different competition scenarios: deterministic oligopoly, sequential oligopoly, extended duopoly, and customer valuation. Extended duopoly model that represents oligopoly competition with 'cartel against single player' formation is found to be the most reliable of the four models because of its ability to consistently predict all observed cases. This proposed model is much simpler than the existing models for any number of players. Besides, optimal pricing strategy based on the model is also developed and is proven to increase the accumulated revenue. Each player can predict the best pricing and capacity allocation strategies as a response to competitors' strategy. Nonetheless, some simplifications on the model coverage are adjusted, such as the number of price levels and one-off games. The models can be applied only for two price levels. One of the critical parts in developing the proposed RM models is the demand model development. However, constructing a correct and robust demand model is not easy because some factors, such as the product itself, customer preference, and the existence of competitors, are not yet considered in the proposed model despite their possible influence on demand and because of the lack of data availability. Thus, for future research, the model's robustness can be improved by developing robust and generic demand function under limited information. In addition, a dynamic game that provides an opportunity to analyse a dynamic response can also be considered to improve model's performance.
To predict the demand of hotel i in the oligopoly competition with hotel 1, 2, 3, … (n -1) B as its competitors, it is a need to play the games: i vs. competitor 1, i vs. competitor 2, i vs. competitor 3, i vs. competitor 4 and so on, until i vs. player (n -1).
( ) ( )
Averaging method is then used to predict the total demand potentially obtained by hotel i as a response to each duopoly competition.
,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,( 1) ,
where N is market size.
Appendix 2: Proof of equation (10)
To predict the demand of hotel i in the oligopoly competition with hotel j and k as its competitors, it is a need to play the games: i vs. j and j vs. k. The explanation below only explained when hotel i bids the highest price among the other players. The same steps are applied to develop the model for other conditions.
Averaging method is then used to predict the total demand potentially obtained by hotel i.
Appendix 3: Proof of equations (11)-(13)
Equation ( 
Equation (13)
Let player i as hotel C, player j as hotel B, and player k as hotel A. Substitute 
